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Competition and Civic Engagement in the Religious Marketplace 
 By Lynne Pepall, Dan Richards, John Straub and Michael DeBartolo 
1.  Introduction 
Faith-based organizations in the United States are distinguished by their diversity, both in their 
varied religious beliefs and practices, and in the nature and extent of their civic engagement.  By civic 
engagement, we refer to the fact that most American churches and synagogues offer more than regular 
worship and religious education services to their members.  They also offer programs and experiences 
that serve to strengthen their members’ bonds of faith. Often these include ways for members to engage 
in their community, or beyond, and provide valued social services and real goods including health-care, 
education, food, housing, and financial assistance. Indeed, Johnson, Tompkins, and Webb [2002] 
estimate that faith-based organizations in the United States provide community and social services to 
over 70 million Americans annually. Similarly, Ronsvalle and Ronsvalle [2000] estimate that roughly 
half of charitable contributions and volunteering in the United States comes from religious 
organizations. These estimates are supported by Putnam [2000] who concludes that more than one half 
of social capital in the US, as measured by volunteering, philanthropy or civic participation, is affiliated 
with faith-based organizations.   
This paper regards the heterogeneity in both spiritual doctrine and the extent of civic engagement 
as key outcomes that any analysis of religiosity in the United States must examine and explain.  To be 
sure, there are features of the American environment that facilitate religious pluralism.  One is the 
constitutional prohibition against a government-sanctioned religious monopoly, which as a result, helps 
to make entry into this sector easier.  The second is the relatively open US immigration policy admitting 
a great number of groups of different denominations and cultural backgrounds.  However, these factors 
are necessary but not sufficient to explain how the evolutionary process in America has led to both the 
diversity and civic-minded character of faith-based organizations. In addition, there must be something 
about the competitive process that drives the evolution of faith-based organizations to attract adherents 
to their mission and become civically engaged.   2
In this paper we investigate the idea that competition among faith-based organizations is a key to 
understanding their civic engagement.  This idea is related to religious market theory. In fact it was 
Adam Smith who wrote early on about the inefficiencies associated with regulated or monopolized 
religious activity and the benefits of religious pluralism.  This idea has been recently revived and 
explored in the seminal work of Iannaccone [1998].  Religious market theory can be broadly 
interpreted to mean that religious freedom and diversity fosters “greater denominational competition”.  
This in turn leads to more dynamic and innovative religious institutions and ultimately more religious 
participation among members of the society. Alternatively, the more regulated or monopolized is 
religious activity then the less dynamic and the less accountable the regulated religious activity 
becomes, and the less religious participation there is. 
The recent or renewed interest in religious market theory has spawned a growing interest among 
economists about how religiosity affects economic outcomes. Barro and McCleary’s  (2003) 
pioneering work investigates how religiosity, as measured through individuals’ religious participation 
and beliefs, affects economic growth in a panel of countries. Relatedly, Gruber (2005) finds strong 
evidence in the US that a higher density of an individual’s religion in an area leads to higher religious 
participation and better outcomes with respect to education, income and marital status. Dehejia (2005) 
et al similarly find that religious participation helps to insure consumption streams. Barro and 
McCleary (2004, 2005) also consider the effect of state religion on religiosity and examine the factors 
determining the likelihood of establishing a state religion.   
In contrast to the foregoing papers, which explore the effect of religion on individual decisions 
and the role of religious practice in explaining economic outcomes, we focus instead on faith-based 
organizations, themselves, and their incentives to attract individual members. That is, we investigate 
the nature of competition in the religious marketplace—both what factors influence that competition 
and the implications that competition has for the role of faith-based organizations in American society.  
Our research thus complements and informs a theme of religious market theory; namely, whether and   3
how religious pluralism promotes greater religious participation and civic engagement as a result of 
fostering a more dynamic religious sector. 
Our starting point is that faith-based organizations (FBOs) compete for potential adherents by 
providing ways for their members to deepen their spiritual relationship.  While an FBO may well be 
unwilling (or unable) to alter its basic spiritual message, it can nevertheless compete for individuals and 
households by instead offering new and different ways to deepen and enrich the spiritual experience 
through participation in the community. For example, organizing soup kitchens or hospital visits, or 
educational services or other forms of civic engagement, can give substance to an FBO’s spiritual 
message and make it attractive to potential followers.  Making visible the mission of a faith-based 
organization through the ways that its members can participate in the community can play an important 
role in attracting new adherents. This suggests that denominational competition for adherents may be a 
force that leads FBOs to focus attention and resources on the more visible measures of its mission.  
Greater competition among FBOs for members will then lead them to expend more effort on building 
visible social capital.  In turn, this leads to increased civic engagement of its members, which is a 
distinctive feature of US churches. 
In Section 2 we develop a formal economic model of how denominational competition influences 
faith-based organizations to build visible social capital.  We adopt a spatial approach to modeling the 
diversity of religious preferences among the population in a community.  Montgomery (2003) and Barro 
and McCleary (2005) also develop a spatial model of religious markets to investigate the relationship 
between religious pluralism and participation. However, our approach to modeling denominational 
competition in a spatial context is different in certain key respects.
1 First, we model the contributions, or 
donations of members to their faith-based organizations and we allow for faith-based organizations to 
compete for adherents by offering other services to complement their religious services.   Competition 
among FBOs in our model can account for both the religious diversity and the extensive civic 
                                                 
1 Our approach differs from Montgomery’s (2003) in that donations and expenditures, or more generally 
financial constraints play no role in his model.  Barro and McCleary (2005) model the religious spectrum as a 
line rather than a circle, which means certain religions in their model, near the endpoints,  have captive 
consumers.  Barro and McCleary (2005) also model FBOs as price-setting organizations.   4
engagement that characterize churches in American society.   In section 3 we offer some preliminary 
empirical analysis that supports some key predictions of the model.   
2.  A Spatial Model of Religious Plurality 
We adopt a spatial approach to modeling the religious preferences among the population in a 
community. The religious preferences of the individuals or households who are potential adherents to a 
faith-based organization are distributed uniformly around the circle with density or population P0.  The 
location xk  of household k on the circle is a complete description of the attributes of religiosity that 
household k prefers.  The circumference of the circle is normalized to one.  Each household consumes one 
unit of religious service per period and is willing to give up or donate resources D to a faith-based 
organization that can provide the religious service that the household prefers. The magnitude of D is a 
measure of the strength of the household’s desire to belong to a faith-based organization.  
Faith based organizations (FBOs) are located at points on the circle. The “location” of an FBO, 
denoted by fi, on the circle describes the basic spiritual message and service of the faith-based 
organization. In locating at a specific point on the circle fi, incurs a sunk cost K. The variable resource 
cost of supplying one unit of the basic service ci is assumed to be the same across all FBOs, and without 
loss of generality the unit cost is normalized to zero.  
The goal of a faith-based organization is to attract adherents and provide religious services to them.  
There is no regulation on the entry of FBOs into the community. That is, there are no barriers to entry 
such as those imposed by state regulated faith-based organizations in other countries, nor do FBOs 
receive any state subsidies. Each FBO located on the circle must therefore in an equilibrium outcome at 
least break even. The revenue of an FBO is generated by donations received from adherents. 
Only the individual or household that is located at the same point on the circle as an FBO has 
preferences that match exactly the spiritual message of an organization.  As in the spatial model adopted 
by Montgomery (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2005) we assume that individuals “travel” at some 
disutility or cost to an FBO located on the circle. The household’s loss in utility when it does not receive 
from an FBO its most preferred version of religious services means that the household is willing to give   5
less than D to the FBO.  Specifically, we assume that the willingness of a household located at xk to 
donate to an FBO located at fi on the circle is defined by: 
  () i k i k ki f x t D f , x V − − =        ( 1 )  
The parameter t measures the disutility cost of consuming a religious service that is located one unit of 
distance away from the household’s preferred religious service.   The disutility cost t could reflect the 
cost of attending offering services at non-preferred time, without music or other rituals valued by the 
individual or household.
2 
A faith-based organization fi can potentially serve adherents xk for whom () . f , x V i k ki 0 ≥  We 
define the set of potential adherents of faith-based organization fi by { } 0 ≥ = ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki k i . If two 
FBOs, denoted by fi and fi+1, adjacent on the circle, are located farther than 2D/t apart on the circle then 
their sets of potential adherents do not overlap.  In this case the two FBOs do not share the same 
potential adherents. A potential adherent of one faith-based organization would not be willing to 
contribute to the other faith-based organization. If, on the other hand, the two FBOs fi and fi+1 are 
located less than 2D/t apart on the circle then their sets of potential adherents do overlap 
or ∅ ≠ +1 i i X X I .  
When two faith-based organization are potentially attractive to an adherent then they have an 
incentive to compete for the potential adherent.  One way FBOs can compete is by offering additional 
services to adherents beyond the purely religious ones.  These additional services could be community 
services, which the household cares about as means of fulfilling the household’s spiritual needs.  As 
noted above, however, they typically also include social services such as health care or educational 
services, or meals for the elderly or day care.    
When  () 0 ≥ i k ki f , x V  and  () 0 1 1 ≥ + + i k ki f , x V then the two FBOs fi and fi+1 have an incentive to 
compete actively for household k. If FBO fi offers services valued at sik while FBO fi+1 offers services 
valued at si+1k to household k then the household will choose to become a member of fi and donate 
                                                 
2 The key dimensions of religiosity are belief, ritual and experience.  The ritual dimension captures the participation 
in religious services or activities.  Different households weigh religious services and activities differently.   6
() i k ki f , x V  to fi when sik > si+1k, and, conversely, become a member of fi+1 and donate  () 1 1 + + i k ki f , x V  
when sik < si+1k.  In the case that sik = si+1k then the individual k will join and donate to the faith-based 
organization whose basic message is closest to xk.   
Suppose that  () i k ki f , x V  >  () 1 1 + + i k ki f , x V , or household k is “closer” to faith-based organization fi, 
than fi+1, and fi+1 is among the n-1faith based organizations the next closest to household k.   In that 
case FBO fi can offer household k additional services whose value is greater than what is feasible for 
faith-based organization fi+1 to offer.  Alternatively, the minimum value of the additional services sik 
that faith based organization fi must offer household k in order to secure the household’s adherence is 
sik =  () 1 1 + + i k ki f , x V . In the absence of additional services being offered, or in the absence of 
competition, household xk would in that case attend and contribute to the faith-based organization that 
is closest to its preferred location. 
In an equilibrium outcome, the number of FBOs n are symmetrically located on the circle.  The 
first case that we consider is when the number of FBOs n is such that in equilibrium n < t/2D and the set 
of potential adherents i X for each FBO fi,  i =1,..n, do not overlap.  Not every household on the circle of 
unit circumference attends a faith-based organization, or the community is “not covered” by FBOs.   
When the community is not covered each faith-based organization fi supplies religious services to 
2P0 D/t adherents and receives donations D
2P0 /t .  In order for a faith based organization to be 
economically viable when the community is not covered we must have that D
2P0 /t  – K > 0.  For the 
remainder of the paper we will assume that intensity of religious preferences, as measured by D and t, 
the sunk cost K, and the population density in the community, P0, are such that 
o P
tK D ≥ . 
For the community not to be covered in an equilibrium outcome it must be the case that a new 
faith-based organization does not find it feasible to come into the community and serve some of the 
households who are not currently being served by any of the n FBOs. First observe that this means   7
that n > t/4D for otherwise since 
o P
tK D ≥ entry would be economically feasible and would occur.
3  
Second it may be economically feasible for the n FBOs to operate in the community, but not feasible 
for a new faith-based organization to enter the community.  This occurs when the potential entry of a 
new faith-based organization in the community leads to an overlap in the set of potential adherents. 
To see this consider the potential entry of a new faith-based organization denoted by fe. The new 
FBO fe will locate at a point on the circle where households are least well served by the existing n FBOs.  
Thus, without loss of generality fe. will locate at a distance 1/2n between FBOs fi and fi+1.  Even though 
the set of members of the established FBOs fi and fi+1 do not over lap, because n > t/4D or alternatively 
because 2D/t >1/2n the potential members of fe do overlap with those of fi and fi+1.  Specifically for the 
FBOs fi and fe there is a subset of potential adherents, defined by { } 0 ≥ ≥ = ) f , x ( V ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki e k ke k ei , 
who would be willing to donate to both faith-based organization fi and fe, and these adherents are “closer” 
to fe.  Similarly, there is a subset of potential members  { } 0 1 1 1 ≥ ≥ = + + + ) f , x ( V ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki e k ke k ei  who 
would be willing to donate and attend fe and fi+1, and they are “closer” to fe.   
In this case the new entrant FBO fe “competes” with fi for the potential members defined by ei X and 
offers additional services that these households care about.  The set of the services that fe must offer in 
order to secure the membership of these k households is { } ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S ∈ = = .   
Similarly, fe must “compete” with fi+1 for the potential members defined by  1 ei X +  and offer additional 
services described by the set  {} 1 1 1 1 + + + + ∈ = = ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S .  The aggregate value of the 
additional services that entrant fe must offer members  ei X  and  1 ei X +  is equal to (D - t/4n)(D/t - 1/4n)P0.  
The sum of the potential donations that the new faith-based organization would receive from its 1/2n 
                                                 
3 If 2D/t < 1/2n and there is no overlapping then the new entrant would serve 2D/t new members and would earn a net 
revenue D
2/t*P0.  Since by assumption
o P
tK D ≥  then unless there is some restriction upon entering this community 
entry would occur and the outcome of n faith-based organizations could not be an equilibrium. 
   8
members is equal to (D/2n - t/16n
2) Po.  Thus the net revenue that the new entrant fe receives from its 
adherents is Re(n) = (D/n - D
2/t -t/8n
2 )Po . 
For the entry of fe not to be feasible it must be that Re(n) -K < 0.  This condition together with the 
condition that t/2D > n > t/4D and the fact that the community is not covered in equilibrium implies that 
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When the community is not covered the established FBOs do not offer any additional social 
services. They supply religious services only and only to some segments of the community.  Each 
faith-based organization in the community earns either positive or zero net revenue. Observe that this 
outcome is likely to occur in communities where the ratio of the sunk cost K to the density of the 
population P0 is high relative to a household’s willingness to contribute or pay for religious services D. 
       Figure 1 
        No Overlapping Equilibrium with No FBO Spending on Services 
          
 
                  
                 D                    
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  1/n                              1/n  9
Suppose now that the number of established FBOs n in an equilibrium outcome is such that 2D/t > 1/n 
> D/t, or equivalently, t/2D < n < t/D   In this case the set of potential adherents  {} 0 ≥ = ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki k i  
for each faith-based organization fi, i =1,.,n, do partially overlap.  That is, for two adjacent FBOs fi and fi+1 
there is a subset of potential members, defined by  { } 0 1 1 1 ≥ ≥ = + + + ) f , x ( V ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki i k ki k ii  who would 
be willing to attend faith-based organization fi and fi+1 but these members are “closer” to fi.  Similarly, there 
is a subset of members  {} 0 1 1 1 ≥ ≥ = + + + ) f , x ( V ) f , x ( V : x X i k ki i k ki k i i who would also be willing to attend fi 
and fi+1, but these potential members are “closer” to fi+1.  
Faith-based organization fi can successfully “compete” with fi+1 for the potential members defined 
by 1 i , i X +  by offering additional non-religious services.  These services, which are often visible social 
services, are defined by the set { } 1 1 1 1 + + + + ∈ = = i , i k i k ki ik ik i , i X x ), f , x ( V s : s S . Similarly faith-based 
organization fi can successfully compete with fi-1 for members  1 − i , i X  by offering to these household 
additional services { } 1 1 1 1 − − − − ∈ = = i , i k i k ki ik ik i , i X x ), f , x ( V s : s S .   
  The aggregate value of the additional services that faith-based organization fi must offer to 
attract the members defined by 1 i , i X + and  1 i , i X −  is equal to (D/t - 1/2n)*(D - t/2n)P0.  The total value 
of the donations that faith-based organization fi receives from all the P0/n members is equal to [t/4n
2 + 
(D - t/2n)/n]P0. Thus the net revenue of each established faith-based organization i is Ri(n) = (2D/n - 
D
2/t  - t/2n
2 )P0.  In equilibrium it must be the case that each established faith-based organization is 
economically viable Ri(n) – K > 0. 
Consider then the potential entry of a new faith-based organization denoted again by fe for this 
case. The new faith-based organization fe would again locate at a point on the circle where households 
are least well served by the existing n FBOs, i.e. at a distance 1/2n between FBOs fi and fi+1.  Even 
though the set of members of the established FBOs fi and fi+1 do not completely overlap, the potential 
members of fe do completely overlap with those of fi and fi+1.   Recall that for this case we assume that 
2D/t > 1/n > D/t, and so by assumption D > t/2n.  Therefore the household located at fi at a distance 
1/2n from fe would be willing to be a member of and donate to the new faith-based organization.     10
The set of potential adherents for the entrant fe thus completely overlaps with adjacent FBOs fi and 
fi+1 and so there is competition for adherents. To attract adherents the new entrant FBO would need to 
offer additional services to each and every potential member of its congregation.  For members who are 
currently being offered religious services by fi+1 the new faith-based organization must offer services 
defined by the set  {} 1 1 1 1 + + + + ∈ = = ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S and for members who would be willing to 
donate and attend fi the new faith based organization offers to these households additional services 
defined by {} ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S ∈ = = .  
The aggregate value of the services that fe must offer its members  ei X and 1 ei X +  is equal to [D/2n 
- 3t/16n
2]P0.  The potential donations that the new faith-based organization would receive from its 
members is equal to [D/2n - t/16n
2]P0.  Thus the potential net revenue of the new entrant Re(n)= 
tP0/8n
2
 .  For entry to be infeasible we must therefore have that tP0/8n
2
 –K < 0.  
The no entry condition, together with the equilibrium conditions that an established FBO is 
economically viable and that t/D > n > t/2D, implies that the equilibrium number of FBOs is n = K
tP
8
0 .  








tK .    This 
equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.  Here, the shaded triangles reflect spending on social services.  FBO fi 
is responsible for one half of the shaded triangle to its immediate left and one half of the shaded triangle 








       Figure 2 
        Partial Overlapping Equilibrium with Some Spending on Services 
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Finally we have the case that in equilibrium the number of FBOs n on the circle is such that D/t > 1/n 
or n > t/D. In this case the set of potential adherents for each faith-based organization fi completely overlaps 
with adjacent FBOs fi+1.    All households located between fi and fi+1 would be willing to donate and attend 
either of FBOs fi or fi+1.  In this case FBO fi must offer additional services and compete for all the members 
of its congregation.  For members who would have been willing to donate and attend fi+1 it supplies 
additional services defined by the set  { } 1 1 1 1 + + + + ∈ = = i , i k i k ki ik ik i , i X x ), f , x ( V s : s S , and for members who 
would have been willing to donate and attend fi-1 it offers to these households additional services defined 
by { } 1 1 1 1 − − − − ∈ = = i , i k i k ki ik ik i , i X x ), f , x ( V s : s S .   
The aggregate value of the additional services that faith-based organization fi must offer to 
members defined by 1 i , i X + and  1 i , i X −  is equal to (D/n - t/4n
2) P0. The total value of the donations that 
faith-based organization fi receives from all the P0/n members is equal to (D/n - t/4n
2) P0.  Thus the net 
revenue of each established faith-based organization i is Ri(n) = tP0/2n
2.  In equilibrium each 
established faith-based organization is economically viable or tP0/2n
2 – K > 0.  
As usual, the equilibrium in this case is defined by the zero profit condition for a new FBO fe.  Such an 
organization would again locate at a point on the circle at a distance 1/2n between FBOs fi and fi+1 and 
again the potential members of fe would also completely overlap with those of fi and fi+1.   The new entrant 
FBO fe, similar to the established FBOs, must offer services to each and every member of its congregation.  
For members who are currently attending fi+1 the new FBO fe must offer additional non-religious services 
defined by the set  { } 1 1 1 1 + + + + ∈ = = ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S , and for members who currently attend fi it 
offers to these household additional services defined by { } ei k i k ki ek ek ei X x ), f , x ( V s : s S ∈ = = .The 
aggregate value of the services that fe must offer its members  ei X  and  1 ei X +  is equal to [D/2n - 3t/16n
2]P0.  
The potential donations that the new FBO would receive from members is equal to [D/2n - t/16n
2]P0.  Thus 
the potential net revenue of the entrant Re(n)= tP0/8n
2
 .  In equilibrium, entry is not feasible, or tP0/8n
2 < K.   12
The no entry condition, together with the equilibrium conditions that an established FBO is 




and that the willingness of households to contribute D is such that D > 
0
2 2 P
tK .  The community is  
covered and each faith based organization offers additional services to all of its members the total value 
of which again is (D/n - t/4n
2) P0.   This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3 below.  Here, the value of 









It is clear that the equilibrium number of FBOs n depends critically on the key structural parameters 
of the model.  Specifically, n depends on the intensity of religious preferences as measured by household 
willingness to contribute D; the disutility cost t of not being served the preferred religious service; the 
density of population P0, and the sunk overhead cost of running a denomination K.  When n is relatively 
low, because for example the sunk cost K is relatively high, then the community may not be covered and 
the amount of spending on civic services will be negligible.  A fall in K would lead to more FBOs 
sustainable in equilibrium, or an increase in n, and as a result more competition for adherents.  This leads 
to increased spending on civic services. Alternatively, a decline in the disutility cost variable t, which is 
also a measure of intensity of religious preference, implies that adherents are willing to “travel” and 
contribute to FBOs further away from their preferred faith.  For a given n the competition for adherents 
increases.  Hence, as t falls fewer FBOs survive in equilibrium.   
      Figure 3 
        Complete Overlapping Equilibrium with Spending on Services 
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It is equally clear that FBO spending on civic activities also varies with the key model parameters.   
First, when the community is not covered and the established n  K
tP
2 2
1 0 ≤ FBOs are not in competition 




tK  > D > 
0 P
tK  the SSi = 0 for i =1,..,n.  However, when the community is covered and there is 
partial overlapping in the sets of potential adherents then FBOs do spend on additional services to attract 
















+ −  for i =1,..,n.   Since 
for this case equilibrium n = K
tP
8








tK  it follows that social 










SSi + − = in this case.  Finally when there is 
complete overlapping in the sets of potential adherents then FBOs have an incentive to spend on  











Since n = K
tP
8
0  and D > 2
o P





K 8 D SS − = . These results are  
summarized below in Table 1. 
 
                                                                   Table 1 
Competition for Adherents  Spending on Social Services  Willingness to Contribute 




tK  > D > 
0 P
tK  































When there is either partial or complete overlapping so that the community is covered and there is 
spending on additional services each FBO has a membership defined by P0/n, which in equilibrium is   14
equal to  t
K P0 8 .  With this in mind, we may then define for these cases, a new variable Y* equal 
to the level of spending on civic services per FBO member. Hence, Y*(D, K , t, P0)=SSi.(D, K, t, P0) 
* K P 8
t
0
 .   For the case where there is a partial overlap of members Y*(D, K , t, P0)  =  









D + − .  For the case where there is complete overlap of members we  




































These three comparative static effects each have a clear underlying intuition.  As community 
members increase the total donation D that they are willing to make, per member spending on civic 
activities also increases.  In contrast, a rise in sunk costs K reduces the equilibrium number of FBO’s, and 
thereby reduces the competitive pressure for each FBO to pursue civic spending as a means of attracting 
members.  Finally, while an increase in the disutility cost t does lead to an increase in the number of 
FBOs, it nevertheless reduces civic spending per member.  The reason is that the higher t makes it more 
difficult for each FBO to reach “distant” potential members.  As a result, a rise in t implies that each FBO 
is more insulated from competition with nearby rivals.  Since this competition is the source of the civic 
spending impulse, a rise in t reduces such spending even as it increases the equilibrium number of FBOs.   
The effect of population density is slightly more complex.  In the case of complete overlapping, it is  








.  It is also easy to show that increases in P0 that switch the equilibrium from 








.  The slight ambiguity arises for 






has an ambiguous sign.  This is because competition in this case leads to service spending to attract 
only marginal consumers whereas Y* is defined as service spending divided by all FBO members. 
In sum, we view religious organizations as participants in a marketplace in which each FBO 
competes for members against rivals offering a somewhat differentiated product.  This competition   15
can take one of two forms.  First, FBO’s can adjust or version their basic religious message or practice 
to the individual needs of consumers but only at some cost.  Second, FBO’s can compete by funding 
civic activities such as hospital work, food assistance, or educational programs that also serve to 
attract members by deepening and enriching their spiritual experience.  In our view, it is this latter 
competition that generates the extensive civic engagement that is somewhat distinctive to American 
FBOs.  The model that we have built gives clear predictions on the impact of key variables on this 
social spending competition.  We now consider a simple test of those predictions in the next section.   
3. Empirical Analysis 
The theoretical model suggests a number of testable hypotheses related to religious market 
competition and its impact on charitable church spending.  However, the model is highly stylized.  
Adherents all are assumed to have the same maximum donation D.  FBO costs are assumed identical, and 
the distribution of potential FBO members is assumed to be uniform.  These are strong restrictions that 
are unlikely to be replicated in the real world.  However, the basic thrust of the analysis is clear.  It is that 
the typically high service spending per member that distinguishes American FBOs reflects competition 
for membership.  It follows, that such spending should increase as that competition intensifies.    
We use data from three sources to test for a relationship between religious market competition 
and charitable church spending.  The sources are the American Religion Data Archive (ARDA), and 
The Presbyterian Church USA (PCUSA), and the US Census (1990 and 2000).  The ARDA’s 2000 
Congregation and Membership Report identifies 149 religious denominations reporting 268,254 
congregations with 141,371,963 adherents, or roughly 50.2% of the US population.  The PCUSA data 
contain detailed information on the membership and finances of all 11,000 of the PCUSA’s 
congregations (with about 2.5 million members) from 1994 to 2000.  Hungerman (2004) has used the 
PCUSA data to see if charitable church spending is displaced or “crowded out” by government 
spending on social services.  We match Hungerman’s (2004) PCUSA data with county-level data from 
the ARDA and the US Census to test the hypothesis that charitable church spending increases with 
religious market competition.   16
We estimate a very straightforward generalization of Hungerman’s (2004) two-stage least squares, 
fixed-effects specification.  Let Yikt represent per-member spending on social services by church i in 
county k in year t.  Hungerman (2004) employs the following fixed-effects specification:   
                   Yikt  = αit + govktδ + Xiktβ + εikt                                                             (2)                                
where αit is a church-and-year-specific intercept (reflecting church and year fixed-effects); govkt is per-
capita welfare spending in county k and year t; Xikt is a vector of observable control variables; and εikt is 
a random error term.
4  Hungerman’s (2004) preferred estimate of δ implies that a $1.00 reduction in per-
capita government welfare spending will be offset, on average, by $0.40 of charitable spending per 
member of PCUSA congregations.  Assuming the same value of δ for all religious denominations, this 
implies crowding out of about $0.20 per dollar of government expenditure since total religious 
adherents account for roughly half the U.S. population.   
Our generalization of specification (2) is based on two simple measure of inter- and intra- 
denominational competition.  Our measure of inter-denominational competition is a Herfindahl index 
based on the ARDA data from 1990 and 2000.  Our Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared percentage 
membership shares of each denomination in a county.  An increase in the index shows an increase in 
concentration and, presumably, a decrease in the intensity of FBO competition.  For example, an index of 
1.0 would imply a religious monopoly in which all religious adherents in the county belonged to a single 
denomination.  Our measure of intra-denominational competition is a “Presbyterian-only” Herfindahl 
index based on the PCUSA membership data from 1994 and 2000.   
Our general expectation is that increases in either Herfindahl index should be associated with 
reductions in charitable church spending.  This effects will be non-linear, even in the symmetrical 
equilibrium outcome of our theoretical model.  Nonlinearities are even more probably in the real world.  
For example, if churches need to be a certain size before their service spending becomes “visible,” then 
the effect of religious market competition may even be non-monotonic.  To allow for a non-linear 
                                                 
4 Gruber and Hungerman (2005) employ a similar strategy for the Depression years, using state data and a broader sample of 
churches.   17
relationship between religious market concentration and charitable church spending, we add polynomials 
in the Herfindahl indices to specification (2).  Our results are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: 
Regression Results (Two-stage least squares with church and year fixed-effects) 
  Dependent  Variable:  Per-member charitable church spending 











1994 – 2000 
2 years: 
1994 and 2000 
2 years: 















                                           Coefficient  
(std. error)   [p-value] 
 
County-level 
Imputed welfare spending  -0.401  
 (.140)  [<.01] 
-0.322  
(0.118)  [<.01] 
-.326  
(.118)   [<.01] 
Herf    -213.3  
(187.9)  [ .26] 
Herf
2     826.5 
(552.0)  [ .13] 
Herf
3    -874.2 
(473.1)  [ .07] 
P-Herf    -177.0  
 (95.1)  [ .06] 
P-Herf
2     116.2 
 (74.8)  [ .12] 
Unemployment rate  2.56 (1.31)  6.88 (2.94)  6.99 (2.93) 
% black  -1.52 (2.56)  .308 (1.26)      .335 (1.26) 
% Hispanic  -1.07 (3.01)  -1.14 (1.71)  -1.58 (1.70) 
% single female-headed hhs  -5.60 (7.09)  -4.04 (3.34)  -3.61 (3.37) 
Per-cap income ($1,000)  0.69 (0.85)  .409 (.580)  .362 (.587) 
% non-citizens  -6.7 (5.55)  -3.42 (2.65)  -2.90 (2.62) 
 
Church-level 
   
% under 18  5.06 (3.50)  2.66 (2.03)  3.14 (2.04) 
% 50-64  -9.15 (4.57)  -8.34 (2.84)  -8.50 (2.87) 
% 65-84  4.29 (4.22)  1.52 (2.41)  1.42 (2.48) 
% over 85  63.63 (30.29)  60.6 (25.9)  62.2 (26.0) 
Mortality  0.70 (0.28)  .649 (.687)  .645 (.685) 
Church Size 50-100  -11.3 (7.65)  -9.49 (9.3)  -10.1 (9.4) 
Church Size 101-150  -18.98 (10.26)  -15.1 (11.3)  -15.9 (11.4) 
Church Size 151-200  -20.88 (10.61)  -14.5 (12.4)  -15.4 (12.5) 
Church Size 201-300  -25.26 (11.33)  -21.9 (13.6)  -23.0 (13.6) 
Church Size 301-500  -34.34 (12.66)  -35.4 (16.7)  -35.6 (16.9) 
Church Size 500+  -37.89 (13.67)  -39.6 (17.9)  -38.6 (18.1) 
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The first column of Table 1 re-prints the results of Hungerman’s preferred specification (2005, Table 
V, pg. 2260).  We have replicated these results with the original data, kindly shared by Professor 
Hungerman.  The estimates in the next column of Table 1 are based on Hungerman’s preferred 
specification, after restricting the data to the years 1994 and 2000.  We limit ourselves to 2 years of data 
since we can only match Hungerman’s PCUSA data with 2 years of data from the ARDA (1990 and 
2000).  Hungerman’s results are not sensitive to the data restriction.  The last column of Table 1 reports 
estimates for a representative specification, after adding polynomials in our two Herfindahl indices.  The 
variable “Herf” is our measure of inter-denominational market concentration, while “P-Herf” is our 
measure of intra-denomination market concentration within the Presbyterian denomination.   
  Before interpreting the Herfindahl index coefficients, note that Hungerman’s crowd-out estimate 
is robust to the addition of these new variables.  The significant coefficient of -.326 on imputed welfare 
spending implies that charitable church spending increases by $0.326 per member when government 
welfare spending in a county falls by $1 per capita.  The aggregate affect depends on the share of a given 
county’s population that belongs to a church.  The national average is about 50%, but adherence rates 
range from 10% to nearly 100% across the 2,127 counties in our data.  Crowd-out would be about $0.16 
on the dollar overall ($0.326 × 50%), but would range from $0.03 on the dollar to $0.33 on the dollar, 
depending on the share of religious adherents in a county.   
The specification reported in the last column of Table 1 includes a cubic in our measure of inter-
denominational concentration (Herf), and a quadratic in the intra-denominational measure (P-Herf).  We 
did try a number of alternative specifications including higher-order terms, and interactions between the 
two measures.  However, the interaction terms were never statistically significant.  The cubic specification 
for Herf reflects our consistent finding that while Herf measures were always jointly significant, they were 
never individually significant at the fourth or higher order.  Non-linear terms P-Herf were never jointly or 
individually significant at conventional levels.  However, they come close and are significant at the 16 
percent level so, we have preserved their role in this estimate.  In short, findings displayed in the last 
column of Table 1 are quite robust and representative of our general results.    19
The three inter-denominational terms (Herf, Herf
2, and Herf
3) are jointly significant (p-value of the 
F-test is .05), and the estimates do imply a non-linear relationship (Herf
2 and Herf
3 are jointly significant 
with a p-value of .02).  The two intra-denominational terms (P-Herf and P-Herf
2) imply a relationship that 
is clearly negative and almost linear, although these two terms are not quite jointly significant. 
Figure 4 depicts the implied relationship between our measure of inter-denominational competition 
and charitable church spending.  The relationship is essentially flat until market concentration exceeds a 
threshold around Herf = 0.45.  At that point, the relationship turns decidedly and increasingly negative.  
This implies that while a limited degree of monopoly power has little effect on civic spending, anything 
approaching the virtual monopoly status found in many countries with an official state religion will 
depress such spending in a statistically significant way.  Thus, as noted at the outset, interdenominational 
competition may be an important reason behind the extensive civic engagement that characterizes 
American FBOs. 
Figure 4 
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 Figure 5 depicts the relationship implied by the point estimates for P-Herf and P-Herf
2.  Again, the 
estimates underlying this relationship are not quite statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the direction of   20
the relationship is clearly—almost linearly—negative.  As the intra-denominational market structure 
becomes less competitive, civic spending again declines. 
Figure 5 
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In order to interpret the effects described in Table 1 and Figures 4 and 5, it is helpful to understand 
the distribution of the population with respect to the Herfindahl measures we have generated.  Figure 6 
(next page) does this with respect to the variable Herf.  As can be seen from that chart, about 26% of the 
US population—more than one-fourth--lives in counties with denominational Herf values above the 
critical 0.45 level.  Further, for these regions, the implied relationship between Herf and FBO civic 
spending  is economically significant for counties in that range.  For example, consider an increase in the 
inter-denominational Herfindahl index from 0.5 to 0.6.
5  The median value of per-member church 
spending for Presbyterian congregations in these counties is $33.42.  Our estimates imply that such a 0.1 
increase in Herf would reduce per-member church spending by about $8 for churches in this range, i.e., 
by about 24 percent.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Approximately 14% of the U.S. Population lives in a county with an inter-denominational Herfindahl index 
between these two values.  See Figure 6.   21
Figure 6 







































We can also conduct a similar thought experiment with respect to the variable P-Herf.  Here, we do 
not provide a population distribution table but simply note first that less than 1 percent of the Presbyterian 
members in the PCUSA data live in counties in which increases in P-Herf do not depress civic spending.   
The average value of P-Herf across all Presbyterian congregations is 0.29; the median value is 0.19, and 
the membership-weighted average is 0.24.  Hence, it is useful to consider the impact of an increase in P-
Herf in counties with a P-Herf value between 0.2 and 0.3.  In such counties, median per-member spending 
is about $29 for congregations  Our point estimated imply that increasing P-Herf by 0.10 would reduce 
per-member civic spending by $12 in such congregations.  This is a reduction of nearly a 41 percent.   
  To summarize, the estimates presented in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 are consistent 
with the our basic hypothesis that charitable church spending should decline as competition in religious 
markets decline.  We find statistically significant evidence to this effect using measures of inter- and 
intra-denominational market concentration.  Our estimates imply economically significant inter-
denominational effects in highly concentrated markets (Herf>0.5).  The implied intra-denominational 
effects would be economically significant for the vast majority of Presbyterian congregations in our data. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
We have derived a spatial model of religious market competition in which FBOs compete in part, 
by funding civic activities such as hospital care or education that strengthen and enrich the spiritual   22
experience of their members.  Broadly speaking, an important prediction of that model is that 
increases in the competitive structure of the religious marketplace should lead to increases in the 
extent of civic spending per member.  We have tested this hypothesis using county level census data 
and data from the Presbyterian Church.  We find that the religious market structure does indeed play 
an important role in determining church spending on public goods.  Most notably, counties in which 
the religious market is heavily concentrated among one or two denominations large churches appear to 
spend significantly less on civic activities.  This effect is nonlinear and does not become decidedly 
negative until our interdenominational Herfindahl Index measures 0.45 or higher.  Yet it is a non-
trivial impact both in terms of its likely magnitude and the proportion of the population that it affects.  
We have also explored the role of intra-denominational competition in affecting Presbyterian 
church-member civic spending by including an additional regressor, P-Herf—a measure of the extent 
of concentration among Presbyterians alone.  Here again, we find that more competition generally 
leads to greater social spending. This negative impact obtains through virtually all of the relevant 
range of Presbyterian experience.  However, it is not quite statistically significant. 
We read this evidence as generally supportive of our theoretical model.  Civic engagement by 
church members increases with competition for those members.  While the effect is non-linear, it 
makes clear that beyond a threshold level, religious market power suppresses FBO spending on social 
services.  In turn, this suggests an explanation as to why American churches spend notably more on 
civic activities than do their counterparts in nations with a single, state-sanctioned religion.    23
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